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ESSAYS 
Foreword 
Half a Century of Federal Trademark 
Protection:  The Lanham Act Turns Fifty 
H. Peter Nesvold* 
Lisa M. Pollard** 
 
A fiftieth anniversary is always special:  on such an occa-
sion, spouses might renew their wedding vows; an em-
ployee might receive a gold watch; or a birthday celebrant 
might fall victim to a surprise party, complete with cham-
pagne and good-natured ribbing.  Among other events, 1996 
marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Lanham Act.1  Ordinar-
ily, few would be so endeared as to acknowledge the half-
century mark of a statute; then again, few would suggest 
that the Lanham Act is an ordinary law. 
The Lanham Act is a comprehensive federal statute gov-
erning trademark law, the purpose of which is most com-
monly stated as guarding the trademark owner against 
trademark infringement and unfair competition, and the 
public against confusion and inaccurate information.2  The 
 
* Editor-in-Chief, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal. 
** Managing Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal. 
1. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West. Supp. 1996)). 
2. See, e.g., Wallace & Co. v. Repetti, Inc., 266 F. 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. 
denied, 254 U.S. 639 (1920) (“In addition to the benefit accorded the owner of a 
trade-mark, it is the purpose of the trade-mark law to confer a benefit upon the 
ultimate consumer.”); Birthright v. Birthright Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1133 (D.N.J. 
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Act thus serves to balance the interests of a consuming public, 
the business community, and fair competition.3  In passing the 
Lanham Act, Congress assured United States citizens, for the 
very first time, national protection against exposure to confus-
ingly similar trademarks;4 Congress also secured to a trade-
                                                                                                                                  
1993) (stating that trademark law as embodied in the Lanham Act serves both the 
public interest “by protecting consumers from false and misleading representa-
tions concerning source, identity, or quality of product service” and the trade-
mark owner by protecting “his or her product or service identified by a distinct 
name or label”); Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Titan Technologies, Inc., 823 F. 
Supp. 1137, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 33 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Trademark 
laws are designed, in part, to protect marketer who owns trademark, but the 
overriding concern has always been to protect the purchasing public from con-
fusing the product it desires to purchase with a similar product from a different 
source.”) (citation omitted); Windsor, Inc. v. Intravco Travel Centers, Inc., 799 F. 
Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  The Windsor court noted: 
The purpose of trademark law is to protect three different interests:  (1) 
the trademark owner’s interest in not having the good reputation asso-
ciated with its mark from being tarnished by inferior merchandise of 
another user, (2) the owner’s interest in being able to enter a related 
field at some future time, and (3) the public’s interest in not being mis-
led by confusingly similar marks. 
799 F. Supp. at 1520 (citing Scarves By Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports, Ltd., 544 F.2d 
1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
3. See S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (“To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the pub-
lic from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business commu-
nity the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion 
from those who have created them to those who have not.”). 
4. Edward S. Rogers, Introduction, in DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK 
MANUAL xvi-xvii (1947); see S. REP. NO. 1333, supra note 3, at 1, reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274 (explaining the goal of the Lanham Act as “protect[ing] the 
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular 
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for 
and wants to get”). 
The Lanham Act sought to remedy the problems arising from the inconsis-
tency in state law and the lack of a uniform federal trademark law which re-
sulted in, among other things, business persons having differing trademark 
rights in the varying states.  See Patrick E. Boland, Wrongful Assault on the Trade-
mark System, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 153, 156 (1987) (“Prior to the passage of the 
Lanham Act, there was much frustration in the business community regarding 
the lack of uniformity in enforcing trademark rights throughout the United 
States.”).  This lack of uniformity among the states in protecting trademark own-
ers’ rights was the result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Rail Road v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that there is no federal common law, 
and therefore required federal courts to apply the law of the state in which they 
sat in state law diversity actions.  Id.  The Senate Committee report on the 
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mark’s owner the goodwill associated with its mark,5 and pre-
vented diversion of trade through commercial misrepresenta-
tions.  Above all, the Lanham Act is lauded for this balance of 
trademark law policies:  “consumer protection, property 
rights, economic efficiency and universal concepts of justice 
. . . .”6 
The Lanham Act has never had the opportunity to grow 
stale.  Revisions began in 1948,7 only two years after the Act 
was passed, and have continued throughout the past fifty 
years, the most recent being an amendment passed in July, 
1996.8  The purpose of amending the Lanham Act has often 
been “to create comity with non-U.S. trademark laws in the 
context of trade negotiations.”9  Regardless of the particular 
purpose, though, the result of such amendments has always 
been the same:  an effective expansion of the Act to meet 
changing societal needs. 
The Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment 
                                                                                                                                  
Lanham Act notes a related reason for, and expresses the import of, passing a 
national trademark law: 
[T]rade is no longer local, but is national.  Marks used in interstate 
commerce are properly the subject of Federal regulation.  It would seem 
as if national legislation along national lines securing to the owners of 
trade-marks in interstate commerce definite rights should be enacted 
and should be enacted now. 
S. REP. NO. 1333, supra note 3, at 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1277. 
5. See id. at 3-5, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1277 (stating that the pur-
pose of the Lanham Act is to protect manufacturers’ good will and prevent di-
version of trade through misrepresentation). 
6. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2.01[2] (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996). 
7. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 869 (1949) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1121) (substituting the language “court of appeals” with 
“circuit court of appeals”). 
8. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 
Stat. 1386 (1996) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d)(9), 1117(c)) (permitting 
trademark owners to opt for judicially determined statutory damages in an anti-
counterfeiting suit). 
9. Anne Hiaring, Principles of Trademark Law, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC 
TRADEMARK LAW 1996, at 7, 11-12 (PLI in Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Lit-
erary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 451, 1996); see also S. REP. NO. 1333, su-
pra note 3, at 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1277. 
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Law Journal is honored to present this collection of essays ex-
ploring issues of trademark law that surround the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Lanham Act.  The anniversary inspires 
many to reflect upon a career devoted to intellectual prop-
erty law and policy; it inspires others to recommend changes 
to the application of the Act, thereby ensuring the statute 
maintains its vigor and continues to address the changing 
face of global competition.  As Professor Joseph Garon 
points out in the lead essay, The Lanham Act:  A Living 
Thing,10 “[t]he beauty of the Lanham Act, like the Constitu-
tion, is its ability to fit the times.”11  Professor Garon high-
lights the Act’s extraordinary ability to evolve in response to 
“vast and unpredictable changes in society . . . .”12 
In Fifty Years of the Lanham Act:  A Retrospective of Section 
43(a),13 Ethan Horwitz and Benjamin Levi highlight key ar-
eas in which section 43(a) of the Act (“section 43(a)”)14 has 
expanded over the past half-century.  Originally interpreted 
as forbidding only “passing off,” or the infringement or un-
authorized use of a mark, section 43(a) has grown—by way 
of judicial interpretation and congressional amendment—to 
prohibit false advertising, including trade libel and product 
disparagement, and infringement of common law marks and 
trade dress.  Messrs. Horwitz and Levi conclude that the 
continued debate over the scope of section 43(a) “will not 
diminish its importance in litigation related to unfair compe-
tition.”15 
The remaining essays in this collection focus on current 
and developing challenges to the Lanham Act.  Carl Op-
pedahl’s essay, Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Do-
 
10. Joseph D. Garon, The Lanham Act:  A Living Thing, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 55 (1996). 
11. Id. at 56. 
12. Id. 
13. Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act:  A Retro-
spective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59 (1996). 
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1996). 
15. Horwitz & Levi, supra note 13, at 60. 
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main Name Trademark Dispute Policy,16 discusses the applica-
tion of trademark law to the Internet—an exciting and rap-
idly advancing communication medium.  As Mr. Oppedahl 
explains, traditional notions of trademark policy clash with 
technical limitations of the Internet.  Mr. Oppedahl argues 
that the current regime for resolving the trademark disputes 
that inevitably follow from this fundamental conflict is in-
adequate, and offers numerous suggestions for resolving 
this issue. 
In The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:  Substantial 
Likelihood of Confusion,17 Eric Prager analyzes the new federal 
trademark dilution statute—one of the most recent amend-
ments to the Lanham Act.  Mr. Prager discusses the new re-
quirements imposed by the federal dilution law over and 
above those of the state statutes, and concludes that there are 
substantial differences between the new federal statute and 
the existing state statutes of which courts and practitioners 
must be aware. 
Finally, in The Trademark Office as a Government Corpora-
tion,18 Professors Jeffrey Samuels and Linda Samuels discuss 
the current organizational structure of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”).  Specifically, they examine 
whether the policies and objectives of trademark law might 
better be served, at least from an administrative standpoint, 
were Congress to remove Trademark Operations from the 
PTO and establish a government corporation wholly de-
voted to those operations.  As Mr. and Mrs. Samuels argue 
persuasively, a government corporation would provide 
Trademark Operations with the regulative freedom “to re-
spond to an ever-increasing workload and to function in a 
 
16. Carl Oppedahl, Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name 
Trademark Dispute Policy, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73 (1996). 
17. Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:  Substantial 
Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 121 (1996). 
18. Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Trademark Office as a Gov-
ernment Corporation, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROPERTY, MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 137 (1996). 
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more business-like manner.”19 
The Lanham Act has become a prominent feature of the 
topography of global intellectual property law.  The Journal 
presents this collection of essays to highlight the fiftieth an-
niversary of the Act, and to foster continued debate as to the 
future of U.S. trademark law. 
 
 
19. Id. at 137. 
